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This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommCafaro and Primack (2014) accuse us of what might be called
‘‘conservation immorality’’ for failing to express sufﬁcient
outrage about extinction and failing to champion the intrinsic
value of non-human species. They mistake our point of view.
Our recent papers (e.g., Kareiva and Marvier, 2012) start from
the assumption that we, as conservationists, want to preserve
as much wild nature and as many species as possible. We
share the impulse to protect species for their own sake, and
we believe unequivocally that human-caused extinction is a
moral wrong and a tragedy.
Why then have we so often emphasized doing conservation for
the beneﬁt of people? Because conservation success requires that
many, many people change their behaviors – including where
and how they live, and how they invest their money and time.
We are concerned that the community of people committed to
the conservation of species for their own sake is too small. We
have presented empirical evidence to support our gut feeling that
messages describing the instrumental values of nature – the ben-
eﬁts for people – are more appealing to audiences that tradition-
ally have fallen outside the committed core of conservationists.
Thus, our writings were never about motivating those of us already
within the conservation community (again, ‘‘we do not wish to
undermine the ethical motivations for conservation action’’ –
Kareiva and Marvier, 2012). They were about motivating the peo-
ple who could be our allies, but do not see themselves reﬂected in
the messages we send.
We ﬁnd it dispiriting to have to argue with other conservation
biologists over who has a greater claim to the moral high ground. It
is unproductive and ultimately self-defeating. But we hope that the
reader will bear with this reply long enough for us to make two
critical points: (1) wanting to protect nature for its instrumental
value does not equate to venal selﬁshness and (2) moral certitude
about conservation is misplaced and potentially repugnant to the
broader public.
On the ﬁrst point, we should remember that conservation is a
deep and enduring human instinct that has long embraced values
besides the prevention of species extinctions. In 1962, before the
U.S. Endangered Species Act existed, John F. Kennedy addressed
Congress with these remarks: ‘‘Conservation can be deﬁned as
the wise use of our natural environment: it is in the ﬁnal analysis,
the highest form of national thrift – the prevention of waste and
despoilment while preserving, improving and renewing the quality
and usefulness of all our resources.’’ Conservation has long been
about saving nature for, rather than from, current and future gen-
erations of people.ons.org/licensAnother point often lost in the debate is that the good feelings
people get from nature – whether these beneﬁts are recreational,
aesthetic, spiritual, or cultural – are actually instrumental values
(Justus et al., 2012). Indeed, appeals to intrinsic value are often just
poorly deﬁned appeals to the kinds of instrumental values that defy
easy economic valuation (Justus et al., 2012). Critics of instrumen-
talist views of nature correctly point out that certain types of eco-
system services remain valuable only until a technological
alternative becomes less expensive. However, many services – such
as the relief from stress or feelings of transcendence that people feel
in encounters with the natural world – are utterly irreplaceable.
Our second point is about the spectacle of conservation biolo-
gists arguing from a position of moral certitude. The right of spe-
cies to exist is an important value, but it is a value that in the
real world often must be traded off against other values, such as
basic human rights and the right to self-determination. Yes, extinc-
tion is a moral wrong, but there are many moral wrongs in this
world, and the reality of conservation practice is too complex
and nuanced for absolute moral conviction. In stakeholder and
community meetings, respect for other values beyond the wrong-
ness of species extinction is essential. Too close an adherence to
Cafaro and Primack’s conservation orthodoxy risks alienating peo-
ple who support conservation, but who acting on their own moral
views and personal sense of what is ethical might choose to elevate
humanity’s duty to children and the poor over our duty to species.
There is not one morality or one ethical high ground – there exists
legitimate differences of opinion about which ethical duties should
take priority.
People engage in and support conservation for many reasons –
for the joy and inspiration they draw from being in nature, because
they love to hunt and ﬁsh, because they want their children to
experience the beneﬁts of outdoor play, because intact forests
can prevent ﬂoods and mudslides, because diverse ﬁsheries pro-
vide less variable yields, and of course because species extinction
is a moral wrong. The diverse motivations for conservation cannot
easily be divided into those that are good or moral and those that
are selﬁsh or immoral. Nor is it clear what good would be achieved
by doing so. We advocate erecting the broadest possible tent for
conservation and celebrating all motivations for conservation, even
when those motivations do not overlap with our own. This gener-
osity of spirit is what will make conservation succeed.
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